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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
: Case No. 930594-CA 
JERRY KRAMBULE, 
: Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
ooooOoooo 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Rule 
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (Supp. 1992), whereby a defendant in a circuit 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals 
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense. In this case the 
Honorable Michael K. Burton, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction for the offense of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute is attached as addendum A: 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. ARE HGN TEST RESULTS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE THAT MUST MEET THE 
ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 702, AND THE 
INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT? 
II. DID THE COURT ERR BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN TEST 
WITHOUT REQUIRING THE STATE TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING 
THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE TEST? 
III. IS THE HGN TEST INHERENTLY RELIABLE? 
IV. DID THE COURT ERR IN ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF FIELD SOBRIETY 
TESTS WHEN THE DEFENDANT WAS OBVIOUSLY INJURED? 
IV. WAS THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN TEST AND THE FIELD SOBRIETY TEST 
RESULTS PREJUDICIAL ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court reviews the denial of defendant's motions 
to suppress in a bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and 
factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and 
reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935040 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993) ; State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) / State 
v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Vigil. 
815 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991). 
In reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence a 
reviewing court must determine if the scientific test meets the 
Utah standard of inherent reliability. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, 397 (Utah 1989). In determining if scientific evidence is 
admissible, the reviewing court must find that "the scientific 
2 
principles or techniques have been properly applied to the facts of 
the particular case by qualified persons and that the testimony is 
founded on that work." Id. at 3 98, n. 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Krambule appeals his conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol on the grounds that the arresting officer was 
not qualified to validate the scientific principles supporting the 
relationship between alcohol ingestion and nystagmus, that recent 
scientific literature demonstrate the unreliable nature of HGN 
evidence, that the field sobriety tests were inadmissable, and that 
admission of the HGN result and the field sobriety tests in this 
case was reversible error. 
FACTS 
1) On July 29, 1993, a jury found Mr. Krambule guilty of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44. 
2) Mr. Krambule was arrested at approximately 11:00 p.m. on 
August 7, 1993 by Midvale City Police Officer Rock Roxburgh 
(hereinafter "Roxburgh") who was dispatched to 117 East 7800 South 
in Midvale where Mr. Krambule was involved in an accident. 
3) Mr. Krambule's truck was hit by a "little gray Toyota 
truck" which was attempting to pass him, causing him to crash into 
3 
a truck parked on the side of the road. Trial Transcript 300 
(hereinafter flT. Tr."). The defendant and two girls who were 
passengers in his truck were injured. The defendant's head hit the 
steering wheel so hard that it broke. As a result, he suffered a 
cut lip, a bloody nose, and he injured his knee as it hit the 
dashboard. T. Tr. 304. Krambule ran to his nearby apartment to 
call 911. 
4) Officer Roxburgh arrived at the scene. From the two girls, 
he obtained information about Mr. Krambule's address, 7875 South 
Candlestick Lane, Apartment No. 304. T. Tr. 149. Roxburgh went to 
the apartment and found Krambule. The officer noticed that the 
defendant had a "bloody nose and also a bloody lip." Motion 
Transcript 11 (hereinafter "M. Tr."); T Tr. 157, 183. Krambule was 
also wearing a neck brace from a previous injury which was soaked 
in blood. T. Tr. 158, 184. 5) Roxburgh admitted that he would 
not administer either the walk and turn test or the one-leg stand 
test to a subject who was physically injured. T. Tr. 185, 186. In 
fact, Roxburgh admitted that he had been instructed concerning this 
in his training as a police officer. M. Tr. 12. Despite his 
obvious injuries, Roxburgh asked Mr. Krambule to do some field 
sobriety tests in order to determine whether he was intoxicated. 
Roxburgh instructed Mr. Krambule to perform the one-leg stand test 
as well as the walk and turn test, both of which according to 
4 
Roxburgh, Krambule failed. M. Tr. 6-9. 
6) On the one-leg stand test, Mr. Krambule was instructed to 
stand with his "feet together arms down to his side. T. Tr. 162. 
Mr. Krambule complained of a sore knee, so Roxburgh "advised that 
it would probably be best if he raised that sore knee and stood on 
his good leg, which he did at that time." T. Tr. 163. Krambule was 
told to keep his arms down to his side while looking at his toes 
while he counted "one thousand one, one thousand two, one thousand 
three, up to one thousand thirty." T. Tr. 163. Mr. Krambule swayed 
during the entire test and hopped several times. T. Tr. 164. 
7) The other field sobriety test Krambule was asked to 
perform was the walk-and-turn test. T. Tr. 165. The walk-and-turn 
test consists of walking an imaginary line nine steps forward and 
nine steps back while the subjects keep their hands down to their 
sides. T. Tr. 166. Once completing the first nine steps, Mr. 
Krambule was ordered to attempt a pivot-type turn and continue 
walking on the imaginary line nine steps in the opposite direction. 
According to Roxburgh, Mr. Krambule had a difficult time standing 
on the line, stating, " [h] e could only stand in it for a couple 
seconds and he would fall out of it. He would lose his balance and 
couldn't stand on the line very long." T. Tr. 167. On the first 
nine steps, Krambule missed heel to toe once and stepped out of 
line twice. He went ten steps instead of nine, and his pivot-turn 
5 
was in the wrong direction. T. Tr. 167. On the second nine steps, 
Krambule "missed touching his heel to toe twice, and he also 
stepped off the line once." T. Tr. 168. Also throughout the test, 
he had his arms up "like an airplane." T. Tr. 168. 
8) . Roxburgh also conducted the HGN test on Mr. Krambule, 
which he also failed. M. Tr. 6; T. Tr. 160. While conducting the 
HGN test, Roxburgh ordered Mr. Krambule to follow an object that 
was 12 inches in front of his eyes while while holding his head 
still. T. Tr. 161.1 He then moved the object across Mr. 
Krambule's field of vision until each "eye gets clear out to the 
corner where it can't get any further." T. Tr. 161; 1984 NHTSA 
Study, 3. Roxburgh was looking for three things as he 
administered the HGN test: (1) the angle of onset of nystagmus2 
1
 The procedures for administering the HGN are outlined in 
two National Highway Traffic Safety Administration publications: 
Tharp, Burns, Moskowitz, Development and Field Test of 
Psychophysical Tests for DWI Arrests, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Driver 
and Pedestrian Research, DOT-HS-8-01970 (March 1981) (hereinafter 
"1981 NHTSA Study"); (2) Improved Field Sobriety Testing, U.S. 
Dep't of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, DOT HS 806 512 (January 1984)(hereinafter "1984 
NHTSA Study"). The 1981 NHTSA Study and the 1984 NHTSA Study are 
attached as addendum "B." 
2
 Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, 
which may be horizontal, vertical or rotary." Dorland's 
Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974). Nystagmus 
"may be present at rest, or it may occur with eye movement." 
McCance & Huether, Pathophysiology: The Biologic Basis for Disease 
in Adults and Children, 415 (C.V. Mosby 1990) . 
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in each eye, T. Tr. 162, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4; (2) lack of smooth 
pursuit, T. Tr. 161, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4; and (3) the presence of 
nystagmus at maximum deviation, (i.e., when the eye is moved as far 
as possible to one side), T. Tr. 162, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4. 
9) Roxburgh's training in HGN consisted of "a couple of days, 
it could have been three, on the detection of DUI drivers" of 
police academy training and inservice training. T. Tr. 139. 
10) Roxburgh has no expertise in the field of toxicology, 
ophthalmology, or pathology, or any subject showing how alcohol 
might affect the human body. Roxburgh could not explain the cause 
of nystagmus or the underlying cause or relationship between 
alcohol ingestion and nystagmus. Roxburgh did, however, 
acknowledge that nystagmus is caused by substances other than 
alcohol. T. Tr. 189. Roxburgh did not testify how he was able to 
distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other forms of nystagmus. 
11) Roxburgh said a 45 degree angle is used to determine 
intoxication because the average person in the population will 
exhibit nystagmus at that angle. However, Roxburgh admitted that 
he did not know if Krambule was "average" and would thus exhibit 
nystagmus at a 45 degree angle or at some other angle. T. Tr. 187. 
He also claimed that "if there is nystagmus prior to 45 degree 
angles (sic) it would just indicate he's got a higher blood alcohol 
level" T. Tr. 187. In this case, Roxburgh did not state the 
7 
precise angle of onset (the point at which the eye begins its 
involuntary oscillation); but, he did notice that prior to 45 
degrees, no nystagmus was noticeable in Krambule's eyes, T. Tr. 
162. 
12) Roxburgh did not use a template or protractor, as 
recommended by the NHTSA, to determine the angle of onset. T. Tr. 
191. Nothing was used to hold Krambule's head still while the test 
was conducted. He was just asked to "keep his head still." T. Tr. 
161, 191. 
13) . Roxburgh read from an article provided by defense 
counsel that states that 50 to 60 percent of sober individuals will 
exhibit the same nystagmus that cannot be distinguished from 
alcohol induced nystagmus.3 T. Tr. 191. Lack of sleep can cause 
nystagmus (T. Tr. 191), as well as a long list of other physical 
conditions, medicines, and other substances. Officer Roxburgh 
never asked the defendant when he had last slept, whether he was 
suffering from any of the other conditions that cause nystagmus, or 
whether he had ingested any substances which cause nystagmus. T.Tr. 
190,191. Roxburgh concluded that Mr. Krambule's eyes "had a very 
obvious nystagmus or jerking movement when the pen was to the very 
far corner of his eye." T. Tr. 162. 
3Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo Science, 2 DWI 
Journal 1 (1987). 
8 
14) Mr. Krambule challenged the State's use of HGN arguing 
that 1) admission of that test violated Mr. Krambule's due process 
rights, 2) the test is not an inherently reliable scientific test, 
and 3) the officer administering the test was not qualified as an 
expert to administer the test or to interpret the results. The 
court denied Mr. Krambule's Motion to Exclude the HGN. The trial 
court instead "treat[ed] [HGN] as any other field sobriety test . 
• . ." Motion Transcript VanHouten page 15 (hereinafter "M. Tr. 
Vanhouten"). The VanHouten Motion Transcript (partial) is attahced 
as Addendum "C". 
15) Roxburgh said Krambule stated that he drank three beers 
earlier in the evening. T. Tr. 157. The officer did not state 
that he knew the quantity or type of alcohol consumed by Mr. 
Krambule, but noted a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's 
breath. T. Tr. 157, 158. The officer did not know when the beer was 
consumed. T. Tr. 158. Krambule admitted to taking some 
prescription drugs and valium, but Roxburgh did not know when the 
defendant had taken them. T. Tr. 158. 
Roxburgh noticed that Krambule "was speaking o.k." (T. 
Tr. 184) , but he was swaying back and forth a little bit and he had 
bloodshot eyes. Based on these observations, Roxburgh suspected 
that Mr. Krambule was intoxicated and requested him to take field 
sobriety tests. 
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16) After performing the last field sobriety test, Mr. 
Krambule requested medical attention because he was "feeling dizzy 
and his head started hurting and headache (sic)." T. Tr. 169. Mr. 
Krambule did not submit to a chemical test because "Mr. Krambule's 
lip was cut and there was a little bit of blood there, I did not 
want to give an intoxilizer test because of the foreign substance 
in his mouth." T. Tr. 172. Roxburgh requested that Krambule submit 
to a blood test, which he refused. T. Tr. 175, 176. There was 
therefore no evidence of Mr. Krambule's blood alcohol content 
(hereinafter "BAC"). 
17) No evidence of alcohol or drugs, prescription or 
otherwise, was discovered while searching Mr. Krambule T. Tr. 55. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE HGN TEST RESULTS ARE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND MUST MEET THE 
ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 702, AND THE 
INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT. 
(1) THE HGN TEST 
Nystagmus is one of three types of abnormal ocular movements4 
4
 The other two types of abnormal ocular movements are 
strabismus and paralysis of individual extraocular muscles. 
McCance & Huether, supra at 415. The primary symptom of strabismus 
is double vision. Strabismus is caused by a "weak or hypertonic 
muscle in one of the eyes." Id. Trauma, cranial nerve pressure, 
and various diseases may cause paralysis of specific extraocular 
10 
defined as "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may 
be horizontal, vertical, rotary, or mixed." Dorland's Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974), see also McCance & 
Huether, supra, at 415. In horizontal or "jerk" nystagmus "one 
phase of the eye movement is faster than the other." McCance & 
Huether, supra, at 415. 
HGN was first used by law enforcement in California in the 
late 1960's to identify persons suspected of barbiturate 
consumption. See generally Ludington, Impaired Driving: HGN Test, 
60 ALR 1129, 1131; 1981 NHTSA Study, Tenney, The Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus Test and Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, New 
Hampshire Bar Journal, 1 Vol. 27:3, 180 (Spring 1986) . "The theory 
behind the gaze nystagmus test is that there is a strong 
correlation between the amount of alcohol a person consumes and the 
angle of onset of the nystagmus." State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 
1112 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Carper & McCamey, Gaze Nystagmus: 
Scientific Proof of DUI?. 77 111. B.J. 146, 147 (1988)). Most 
people, however, will exhibit some nystagmus or jerking as their 
eyes track to the extreme side. Witte, 836 P.2d at 1112 (citing 
1983 NHTSA Study). 
The 1984 NHTSA Study outlines the procedures for administering 
muscles. The primary symptom of paralysis of specific extraocular 
muscles is drooping of the eye. Jd. 
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the HGN. The officer should first ask the suspect to remove 
glasses or hard contact lenses. 1984 NHTSA Study, at 3 . A suspect 
is then ordered to keep his head still and to follow the stimulus -
- usually a pen, flashlight, or the officer's finger -- with his 
eyes only. Id. The officer then moves the stimulus across the 
suspect's field of vision until the eye moves to the extreme side. 
Id. The 1984 NHTSA Study recognizes that some suspects will move 
their heads5; the officer is thus instructed to use a flashlight 
or his free hand for a chin rest. Id. 
When conducting the HGN, the officer looks for three signs in 
each eye: (1) angle of onset occurring before 45 degrees in each 
eye;6 (2) ability of the eye to follow the moving object 
5
 Head movement will affect the officer's estimation of angle 
of onset, thus affecting the result of the test. See Rouleau, 
Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am Jur Proof 
of Facts 3d 439. For that reason, the 1984 NHTSA Study requires 
officers learning how to conduct the HGN to use a template when 
determining the angle of onset. 1984 NHTSA Study, at 3. 
6
 An angle of onset of 45 degrees or less is said to 
correlate to a blood alcohol content (hereinafter "BAC") of .10. 
1981 NHTSA Study at 82-83, R. 283-84. NHTSA contends that the 
sooner the angle of onset, the higher the BAC. Several recent 
studies question the reliability of the 45 degree angle of onset. 
See generally Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo Science, 
2 DWI Journal 1, 2 (1987) (citing Toglia, Electronvstagmographv: 
Technical Aspects and Atlas (1976)) (50%-60% of sober individuals 
will exhibit nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol nystagmus 
when deviating eyes more than 40 degrees to the side) ; Rouleau, 
supra at 453 (citing recent studies demonstrating lack of 
correlation between angle of onset and predicted BAC). 
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smoothly;7 and (3) the presence of moderate or distinct nystagmus 
when the eye is moved as far as possible to the side. 1984 NHTSA 
Study at 4 . If the officer finds four of the possible six clues, 
then he can "classify [the suspect's] [blood alcohol content] BAC 
as above .10 percent." Id. 
(2) THE HGN TEST AND ITS RESULTS ARE BASED ON SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES 
The large majority of the jurisdictions considering the 
admissibility of HGN test results have found the test to be based 
on scientific principles. State v. Cissne, 865 P.2d 564 (Wash.App. 
Div. 3 1994); State v. Witte. 836 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1992) (The 
HGN test is based upon scientific principles and exceeds common 
knowledge); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171, 178 (Ariz. 
1986) ("The HGN test is a different type of test from balancing or 
walking a straight line because it rests almost entirely upon an 
assertion of scientific legitimacy rather than a basis of common 
knowledge."); Ex Parte Malone, 575 So. 2d 106, 107 (Ala. 1990) 
(admission of HGN without showing test's reliability or scientific 
basis upon which it is based rendered admission of test results 
reversible error); People v. Williams, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1326, 1334, 
5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (1992)) (conclusion drawn from HGN results 
7
 The 1984 NHTSA Study instructs the officer to "be sure that 
the jerkiness was not due to your moving the object in a jerky 
manner." 1984 NHTSA Study at 4. 
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based on knowledge, training, and experience which was clearly 
beyond common experience); Commonwealth v. Miller. 367 Pa, Super. 
359, 365-66, 532 A.2d 1186 (1987) (expert testimony required to 
establish adequate foundation regarding results of police officer's 
interpretation of HGN); State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 
P.2d 488 (1991); State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 887 (La. 
App.) writ denied 568 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1990); State v. Wheeler, 
764 S.W. 2d 523, 524-25 (Mo. App. 1989); State v. Borchardt, 224 
Neb 47, 58-59, 395 N.W. 2d 551 (1986); People v. Torrey, 144 A.D. 
2d 865, 866, 534 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1988); State v. Reed, 83 Or.App. 
451, 454-55, 732 P.2d 66 (1987); State v. Barker, 179 W. Va. 194, 
197-98, 366 S.E. 2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222, 762 
P.2d 853 (1988); State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 631 (AK App. 1990). 
The large majority of jurisdictions require that a Frye 
standard or similar guarantee of trustworthiness be demonstrated 
before admitting the test into evidence. See e.g., State v. 
Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 179 (Ariz 1986) (proponent of HGN must 
demonstrate that scientific principle has gained general acceptance 
in scientific community, "subject to a foundational showing that 
the expert was qualified, the technique was properly used, and the 
results were accurately recorded.")8 
8
 Three states hold that HGN is not Scientific Evidence: 
State v. Bresson, 51 Ohio St. 3d 123, 129, 554 N.E. 2d 1330 
(Ohio 1990) (HGN different from other scientific tests such as 
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(3) THE FRYE STANDARD IN UTAH 
The trial court found that the HGN was a scientific test 
subject to the admissibility requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 
702 and the Philips inherent reliability standard, R. 590-91; see 
Philips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah 1980); Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d at 398 (Utah 1989). Rule 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of opinion or otherwise. 
While rule 702 is the general rule for admissibility of 
scientific evidence, "where expert testimony is based upon novel 
scientific principles or techniques, courts have long imposed 
additional tests of admissibility that antedate the [rules of 
evidence]." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. The purpose for imposing 
a more restrictive test for judging the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, as a threshold matter, is to insure that only reliable 
evidence go to the finder of fact. The court noted the danger of 
Polygraph because no special equipment required. Officer must 
establish knowledge of test, training, and ability to interpret 
observations for test to be admissible) . State v. Murphy, 451 
N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 1990) (Iowa adopts liberal approach to 
admissibility of technical information -- unnecessary to establish 
foundation for HGN evidence through scientific testimony); and 
Finlev v. State, 809 S.W. 2d 909, 913-14 (Tex. App. 1991) (HGN 
admissible through lay or expert witness to prove intoxication, but 
may not be used to prove exact BAC) 
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admitting unproven scientific principles: 
One danger being guarded against is the tendency of the finder 
of fact to abandon its responsibility to decide the critical 
issues and simply adopt the judgment of the expert despite an 
inability to accurately appraise the validity of the 
underlying science. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. HGN is a novel scientific principle or 
technique. See e.g., Witte, 836 P.2d at 1116. 
In Philips, 615 P.2d at 1230, the Utah Supreme Court outlined 
the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence noting 
first the paradigm case in the field, Frve v. United States. 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Court, in quoting Frye, stated: 
scientific tests still in experimental stages should not be 
admitted in evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a 'well recognized scientific principle or discovery7 is 
admissible if the scientific principle from which the 
deduction is made is 'sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.' 
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014). 
The court went on to articulate a standard of admissibility 
termed "inherent reliability" which maintains the basic framework 
of the Frye standard: 
Tests that have passed from the experimental stage may be 
admissible if their reliability is reasonably demonstratable. 
An analysis of the admissibility of scientific evidence, while 
taking into account general scientific acceptance and 
widespread practical application, must focus in all events on 
proof of inherent reliability. 
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (citations omitted). 
The admissibility of scientific evidence may be presented in 
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two different ways: (1) a request that the trial court take 
judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the testimony's 
foundational principle; or (2) a request for an evidentiary hearing 
where evidence is presented in support or against the claim of 
inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398. In the first 
instance, judicial notice, the proponent must demonstrate "a very 
high level of reliability ..." before a court may take judicial 
notice of the test's scientific reliability. .Id. Kofford v. Flora, 
744 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1987) (scientific scholars in relevant 
field unanimously agree that HLA paternity test is reliable). 
Under Philips, Kofford, and Rimmasch, the proponent of 
scientific evidence that is not suitable for judicial notice must 
make an initial foundational showing that the principles or 
techniques underlying the proffered testimony meet the standard of 
inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 3 98. In the absence of 
such an initial showing the evidence is excluded. JEd. In either 
case, once the threshold requirement for inherent reliability is 
established, the court must still determine if the offered evidence 
is helpful to the trier of fact. Id. at 398 n. 4. (trial court 
required to balance probativeness of proffered evidence against 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN TEST 
WITHOUT REQUIRING THE STATE TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING 
THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE TEST? 
The State presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent 
reliability of the HGN test within the relevant scientific 
community. The relevant field of qualified experts remains largely 
undefined. Compare Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 191-92 (recognizing 
behavioral psychology, highway safety, neurology, and 
criminologists as relevant scientific field); Grier, 791 P.2d at 
629 (neurologist and pathologist comprise relevant scientific field 
for determining reliability of HGN for limited purpose of probable 
cause to arrest); Williams, 5 Cal Rptr. 3d at 133, 135-36 
(supervisor of forensic alcohol analysis and drug section of state 
crime could not offer expert testimony on reliability of HGN test 
because of widespread disagreement within the scientific 
community). Furthermore, the studies and cases standing alone 
are insufficient to allow the court to take judicial notice. See 
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1236 (articles submitted by proponent of 
paternity test not sufficient, in absence of expert testimony, to 
determine as matter of law that paternity test has achieved general 
acceptance in scientific community); Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 
("very high level of reliability is required before judicial notice 
can be taken."); State v. Reed, 83 Or. App. 451, 732 P.2d 66, 69 
(Or. App. 1987) (error for trial court to take judicial notice of 
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HGN test reliability in absence of expert testimony). 
Officer Roxburgh lacks the specialized scientific training to 
testify about the test's scientific reliability. See Williams, 5 
Cal Rptr. at 134 (arresting officer not qualified to give expert 
opinion that suspect's nystagmus was caused by alcohol 
consumption); State v. Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1988) 
(error to admit HGN when only testimony was from arresting officer 
whose testimony consisted of defining HGN and explaining how he 
conducted test); State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb, 
1986) (arresting officer, who received training through police-
sponsored seminar, not qualified to testify as expert witness to 
verify reliability of test); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa. Super. 
359, 532 A.2d 1186, 1189-90 (testimony from officer who 
participated in two day HGN training course insufficient to 
establish foundation for test's admission); Middleton v. State, 780 
S.W.2d 581 (Ark. App. 1989) (testimony of arresting officer alone 
unable to establish reliability and general acceptance of HGN) ; 
State v. Reed, 83 Or. App. 451, 732 P.2d 66, 69 (Or. App. 1987) 
(Officer who had received in-service training for HGN and conducted 
test over 100 times in field not qualified as expert to testify 
regarding reliability of HGN test). 
Roxburgh has no special scientific training in ophthalmology 
(medical fields familiar with neurological malfunction of smooth 
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eye tracking patterns caused by alcohol or other neurological 
causes which may result in nystagmus); pharmacology and toxicology 
(medical fields familiar with the physical, emotional, and 
physiological effect of alcohol and drugs); or behavioral 
psychology (effects of alcohol on the movement of the eye) . See 
e.g., Miller, 532 A,2d at 1189-90 (non-scientific police training 
insufficient to qualify officer as scientific expert). 
The California Court of Appeals explained the problem of 
allowing police officers with no scientific expertise to state 
their opinion regarding the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
and HGN: 
[HGN] rests on scientific premises well beyond [the 
officer's] knowledge, training, or education. Without some 
understanding of the processes by which alcohol ingestion 
produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation is, how other 
possible causes might be masked, what margin of error has been 
shown in statistical surveys, and a host of other relevant 
factors, his opinion on causation, notwithstanding his ability 
to recognize the symptom, was unfounded. 
Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
In sum, police officers lack the scientific training and 
expertise necessary to validate the scientific principles upon 
which the HGN is premised. Although a police officer may testify 
as to his observations, those observations do not validate the 
underlying scientific principle. Hearsay statements learned in 
police school regarding the HGN's reliability are unquestionably 
insufficient to establish the scientific foundation mandated by 
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Philips. Accordingly, the State must produce expert testimony, 
other than line officers, to establish the inherent reliability of 
the HGN test. See Philips, 615 P. 2d at 1236 (laboratory technician 
who completed basic workup on paternity blood tests not qualified 
to testify with respect to scientific validity of test). 
III. THE HGN TEST IS NOT INHERENTLY RELIABLE 
(1) The Correctness of The Principles Underlying The Test 
In Witte v. Kansas, 836 P.2d at 1121, the Kansas Supreme Court 
found that ff[t]he reliability of the HGN test is not currently a 
settled proposition in the scientific community." It concluded 
that HGN did not meet the foundational requirements for 
admissibility of scientific evidence. Jd. at 1119. More 
importantly, the court reviewed a number of recent scientific 
articles that question the scientific reliability of the HGN test9 
and which recognize division within the scientific community 
regarding the reliability of the HGN test. See Williams. 5 Cal. 
9
 Those articles include Cowan & Jaffe, Proof and Disproof of 
Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Evidence of Observable 
Intoxication and Coordination Testing, 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 
459 §12 (1990); Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo 
Science, 2 DWI Journal 1, 3-4 (1987) ; Rouleau, Unreliability of 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 43 9 § 
7, p. 452 (1989); 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases §§ 8A:06, 
8A:08 (3d ed. 1992); 2 Nichols, Drinking/ Driving Litigation § 
26:01 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
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Rptr. at 133 (relevant scientific community "disagree on the 
accuracy and reliability of the HGN test for identifying alcohol 
impairment.") . 
(2) Accuracy and Reliability of Methods Utilized in Applying HGN 
Recent scientific studies, articles and legal 
publications, and updated case law question the reliability of the 
HGN test. NHTSA identifies a 45 degree angle of lateral deviation 
as the crucial point for estimating a BAC of .10. 1984 NHTSA Study 
at 3-4. Even NHTSA concedes that officers using the 45 degree 
angle of onset incorrectly estimate BAC 22% of the time. 1981 
NHTSA Study at 25-30. One other study concludes that as many as 
50% to 60% of sober individuals who deviate their eyes more than 40 
degrees to the side will exhibit a form of nystagmus 
indistinguishable from alcohol nystagmus. Pangman, supra at 2 
(citing Toglia, Electronystagmography: Technical Aspects and Atlas 
(1976)) . Another study contradicts the NHTSA findings and instead 
concludes that a lateral deviation of 40% correlates to a BAC of 
.06. Pangman, supra at 2 (citing Aschan, Different Types of 
Alcohol Nystacrmus, Acta Otolaryngologica Supp. 14 0:69 (1957) and 
Aschan, Bergstedt, Goldberg & Laurell, Positional Nystacrmus in Man 
During and After Alcohol Intoxication, 17 Q.J. of Studies on 
Alcohol 381 (1956)). Still another study concludes that 
22 
individuals with a purported BAC of .10 do not exhibit nystagmus 
until the eye is deviated to a 51 degree angle. Pangman, supra at 
2 (citing Lehti, The Effect of Blood Alcohol Concentration on the 
Onset of Gaze Nystagmus, 13 Blutalkohol 411 (1976) ) . 
At least one law enforcement agency concluded that "there was 
virtually no correlation between the actual value of blood alcohol 
concentration and the predicted value based upon the angle of onset 
of nystagmus.1' Rouleau, supra at 453 (citing Norris, The 
Correlation of Angle of Onset of Nystagmus With Blood Alcohol 
Level: Report of a Field Trial, 25 (No. 6) Journal of Forensic 
Science Society 476 (1985). Although the study found a correlation 
between the breath alcohol reading and angle of onset of nystagmus, 
the author concluded that the BAC prediction was influenced by the 
officer's prior knowledge of the subject's breath test result. The 
testing officers were incorrect approximately 50% of the time when 
blood was taken because BAC results were not known prior to 
administering the HGN test. Simply put, the testing officers were 
able to manipulate the HGN results when they knew an actual BAC 
from the breath testing, but could not come close to the correct 
BAC prior to learning the results of the blood test. Rouleau, 
supra at 453. 
(3) Effect of Variables that Influence Accuracy of Test 
Roxburgh admitted that several variables affect the accuracy 
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of the test. He was aware that mental problems, health problems, 
and common substances such as caffeine can cause nystagmus, T. Tr. 
190. He did not testify how he was able to distinguish alcohol 
nystagmus from other forms of nystagmus. 
Recent scientific studies expand the list of factors that may 
cause nystagmus: 1. problems with inner ear labyrinth; 2. 
irrigating ears with warm or cold water; 3. influenza; 4. 
streptococcus; 5. vertigo; 6. measles; 7. syphilis; 8. 
arteriosclerosis; 9. muscular dystrophy; 10. multiple sclerosis; 
11. Korsakoff's syndrome; 12. brain hemorrhage; 13. epilepsy; 
14. hypertension; 15. motion sickness; 16, sunstroke; 17. eye 
strain; 18. eye muscle fatigue; 19. glaucoma; 20. changes, in 
atmospheric pressure, Pangman, supra at 3; 21. poor light 
conditions, Rouleau, supra at 456; 22. nicotine, id. at 455; 
23. caffeine, id. at 455; 24. Aspirin, id. at 455; 25. 
antihistamines, id. at 455; and 26. circadian rhythms. Id. See 
also Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (State's forensic alcohol 
expert "readily admitted that many other factors can be responsible 
[for HGN] and could lead to a 'false positive'"). 
(4) Establishing that the Test Performed in this Case was 
Performed in Accordance with Proper Procedures and with Proper 
Materials and Equipment. 
It is important to properly estimate the angle of lateral 
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deviation. Because determination of the angle of onset is such a 
sensitive measurement, the NHTSA in its HGN studies and others 
conducting HGN research use a mechanical device to anchor the head 
in a stable position. 1981 NHTSA Study at 6, 16; see Lehti, supra, 
13 Blutalkohol 411, Aschan, supra Supp. 140:69. Angular 
measurements were then obtained through the use of protractors to 
precisely measure the angle of onset. 1981 NHTSA Study at 16. 
In contrast to laboratory procedures, a roadside test 
administered by a police officer has no mechanical device to ensure 
that the suspect's head does not move. The field officer simply 
instructs the suspect to "Keep your head still."10 1984 NHTSA 
Study at 3. It is difficult to conceive that even a sober person 
could maintain his head in a perfectly fixed position without the 
use of a mechanical device. Maintaining a fixed position becomes 
increasingly unlikely when the suspect is nervous. Additionally, 
police officers in the field are unlikely to perceive subtle head 
movements which may affect the accuracy of the test since even 
subtle head movement will render the results of the HGN test 
invalid for determining the suspect's level of intoxication. 
IV. INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PERFORMANCE ON FIELD 
10
 NHTSA also instructs the officer to use a flashlight or his 
free hand for a chin rest if the suspect moves his head. 1984 
NHTSA Study at 3. 
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SOBRIETY TESTS VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND RULE 403 WHEN THE DEFENDANT 
IS OBVIOUSLY INJURED. 
Both the article 1 §7 of the Utah Constitution and Amendment 
V of the United States Constitution prohibit denial of a person's 
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 
Due process is not necessarily judicial action. State v. 
Christiansen, 163 P.2d 314 (1945). And the terms "life, liberty, 
and property" are not to be construed narrowly, but broadly--they 
represent the "three great subdivisions of all civil rights." 
McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 85 P.2d 608 (1938); See also 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165. 
Jerry Krambule was denied due process of law when Officer 
Roxburgh requested that he perform field sobriety tests when he was 
obviously injured. In the accident, the defendant's head hit the 
steering wheel so hard that it broke. As a result, Krambule 
suffered a cut lip, a bloody nose, and he injured his knee as it 
hit the dash. T. Tr. 304. Krambule ran to his nearby apartment to 
call 911. 
When Roxburgh located Krambule, he noticed that he [Krambule] 
had a "bloody nose and also a bloody lip." M. Tr. 11; T Tr. 157, 
183. Krambule was also wearing a neck brace from a previous injury 
which was soaked in blood. T. Tr. 158, 184. On cross-examination, 
Roxburgh admitted that he would not administer either the walk-and-
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turn test or the one-leg stand test to a subject who was physically 
injured. T. Tr. 185, 186. In fact, Roxburgh admitted that he had 
been instructed concerning this in his training as a police 
officer. M. Tr. 12. Despite his obvious injuries, Roxburgh asked 
Mr. Krambule to do some field sobriety tests in order to determine 
whether he was intoxicated. Roxburgh instructed Mr. Krambule to 
perform the one-leg stand test as well as the walk-and-turn test, 
both of which according to Roxburgh, Krambule failed. M. Tr. 6-9. 
Because of his condition, Krambule never should have been 
asked to perform either the walk-and-turn test or the one-leg stand 
test. Officer Roxburgh did not follow proper procedure when asking 
the injured Krambule to perform these two field sobriety tests. 
In the context of inventory searches after an automobile 
impoundment, whether or not a police officer conducts that 
inventory according to police procedures is extremely important. 
If proper procedure is not followed, the remedy should be 
suppression of any evidence found. State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 
613 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
Because Roxburgh failed to follow proper procedure taught at 
the police academy (M. Tr. 10) , the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of Krambule's performance on those field sobriety tests. 
This evidence should have been excluded because the evidence's 
probative value substantially outweighed "the danger of unfair 
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prejudice" to the defendant. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. It 
was unfair for the jury to hear Roxburgh's "expert" opinion that 
based upon Krambule's performance of these tests, Krambule was 
under the influence of alcohol and "incapable of safely operating 
a motor vehicle." T. Tr. 168. 
V. THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS AND THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
"In order to constitute-reversible error, the error complained 
of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its 
absence." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the instant case, no breath test or blood test evidence was 
available at trial. The only evidence of Mr. Krambule's 
intoxication was introduced by way of testimony from a witness, 
Chantel Herrmann, and the police officer conducting field sobriety 
tests, Officer Rock Roxburgh. 
Chantel Herrmann testified that she was on her way to work on 
August 7, 1992, when she saw Jerry Krambule's truck "swerving all 
over the road, just all over." T.Tr. 94. She witnessed Jerry's 
truck as it collided with a truck parked on the side of the road. 
T. Tr. 25. There were no other witnesses of Mr. Krambule7s driving 
pattern. 
Ms. Herrmann's testimony was entirely incredible. The reason 
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for this is that Ms. Herrmann caused the accident and drove off 
without stopping to help. T. Tr. 95. Herrmann said she did not 
cause the accident. T. Tr. 98. However, Jerry Krambule testified 
that the driver of "a little gray Toyota truck", Chantel Herrmann, 
tried to illegally pass him. To avoid being hit by an oncoming 
car, "she swerved back over real fast and hit the front part of my 
truck". T. Tr. 300. As a result, Krambule's car veered to the 
right and smashed into a parked truck. A passenger in Krambule's 
car also testified that they were hit by a truck trying to pass 
them. T Tr. 272, 173. Another witness yelled to Jerry as he was 
running to call 911, "I got her plate number!", which suggests that 
he saw Chantel Herrmann hit Jerry Krambule's truck. T. Tr. 307. 
The physical evidence gathered by police officers at the scene 
indicated that Krambule's truck had been hit on the left front 
fender. Roxburgh testified that he received information from a 
witness to the accident that "a vehicle forced [Jerry Krambule] off 
the road." T. Tr. 206. And Roxburgh examined Krambule's truck and 
"found on the front driver's side, the front fender looked like 
there was a side-swipe type hit and a little bit of paint transfer 
off of one object onto his vehicle." T. Tr. 207. Officer Kenneth 
Yurgelon also noticed that there was fresh paint transfer on the 
fender of Krambule's vehicle where he claimed he had been hit by 
Ms. Herrmann. T. Tr. 220. 
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In other areas, Ms. Herrmann was obviously not telling the 
truth. She stated that the accident occurred at about 9:30 p.m. T. 
Tr. 93. She said she "punched in" eight minutes before 10:00 p.m., 
which is when her shift began. T. Tr. 96, 97. Officer Roxburgh 
testified that he was dispatched to the scene of the accident a 
10:38 p.m. and did not believe the accident had occurred an hour 
earlier. T. Tr. 193. Officer Yurgelon also testified that the 
accident occurred after 10:00 p.m.. T. Tr. 216. 
Both Officers Roxburgh and Yurgelon described the accident as 
"very serious." T. Tr. 182, 216. Chantell Herrmann did not stop 
for this "serious accident" because she caused the accident. She 
was speeding and was late for work, tried to pass Mr. Krambule and 
clipped his front fender, causing his truck to veer into the 
vehicle parked on the side of the road. 
Ms. Herrmann is a biased witness. By admitting to causing the 
accident and then fleeing the scene, Ms. Herrmann would possibly be 
subjecting herself to criminal charges and a civil suit for damages 
in the future. Her testimony is not believable. The jury 
obviously did not believe her, because Krambule was acquitted of 
the charge of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL CAUSING AN 
INJURY ACCIDENT. The jury did not feel Krambule had caused the 
accident. In the same way, it is reasonable to believe that the 
jury did not believe Ms. Herrmann's testimony about Krambule's 
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driving pattern that night. 
In order to get a ruling that admission was harmless error, 
the other evidence indicating intoxication in the case must be very 
convincing. See State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W. 2d 551 (Neb 1986) 
(dangerous and erratic driving almost causing accident, inadequate 
performance on Field Sobriety Tests, admission to drinking, slurred 
speech, and Prosecutors's statement in opening that Defendant's BAC 
was .18 make admission of HGN harmless error); Commonwea11h v. 
Miller, 532 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Pa. Super. 1987) (Admission of HGN 
harmless error in light of other evidence showing that Defendant 
was involved in accident, drove away from police at excessive 
speed, went through stop sign, drove over curb, fought with police, 
failed all field sobriety tests, had slurred speech, and odor of 
alcohol). 
In the absence of the HGN, there is a reasonable likelihood 
the jury would have acquitted Mr. Krambule. See Witte, 836 P.2d at 
1121 (admission of HGN reversible error by leading jury to believe 
that result supported Intoxilyzer reading); Ex Parte Malone, 575 
So. 2d at 107 ("The problem created by improper admission of the 
HGN evidence is due to the scientific nature of the test and the 
disproportionate impact it might have had on the jury's decision-
making process.") . Indeed the admission of HGN here is the kind of 
evidence likely "to distort the fact-finding process by reason of 
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its superficial plausibility and its potential for inducing fact 
finders to accept experts' judgments on critical issues rather than 
making their own." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 399. The critical issue is 
whether Mr. Krambule was impaired and unable to safely operate his 
vehicle because he was under the influence of alcohol. If the jury 
considered the remaining evidence, absent the HGN, it is likely 
that the jury would have reached a different result. See Witte, 
836 P.2d at 1121. 
Mr. Krambule was obviously injured that night. His performance 
on the field sobriety tests should not have been admitted. With no 
believable testimony on the driving pattern, on the cause of the 
accident by Krambule, or on the performance of the field sobriety 
tests, the jury must have given great weight to the officer's 
testimony on the HGN and Krambule's performance on the field 
sobriety tests. Without the HGN evidence and the field sobriety 
test evidence, Krambule would most likely have been acquitted for 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant asks the court to find that the HGN is 
scientific evidence subject to the inherent reliability test; that 
the arresting officer was not qualified to validate the scientific 
principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
32 
and nystagmus; that recent scientific literature demonstrate the 
unreliable nature of HGN evidence; that introduction of evidence on 
performance of field sobriety tests was a violation of due process; 
that admission of field sobriety tests were unduly prejudicial 
pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence; and that admission of 
the HGN result and the field sobriety test performance in this case 
was reversible error. 
DATED this n day of June, 1993. 
Susanne Gustin 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
tact directly tne insurance company or outer 
vider of security as described In Subsection (7) 
and request verification, which the department 
may require to be in writing, within 30 days of 
receipt of the request, of the accuracy of the infor-
mation submitted as of the date of the traffic of-
fense for which the citation was issued. 
(c) If the department does not receive verifica-
tion within 35 days after mailing the request, or 
within the 35 days receives notice that the infor-
mation was not correct, the department shall 
take action under Subsection 41-2-128(12). 
(6) (a) The owner of a vehicle with unexpired li-
cense plates for which security is not provided as 
required under this chapter, shall return the 
plates for the vehicle to the Motor Vehicles Divi-
sion unless specifically permitted by statute to 
retain them. 
(b) If the owner fails to return the plates as 
required, they shall be confiscated under Section 
41-2-134. 
(8) The department may make rules for the en-
forcement of this section. 
(7) In this section, "evidence of owner's or opera-
tor's security" means: 
(a) the name of the insurance company which 
issued the insurance policy under Subsection 
41-12a-103(9Ka), and the number of the insur-
ance policy; 
(b) the name of the surety which issued the 
surety bond under Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(b), 
and the number of the insurance policy; 
(c) the number of the certificate of deposit is-
sued by the state treasurer under Section 
4M2a-406; or 
(d) the number of the certificate of self-funded 
coverage issued by the department under Section 
41-12a-407. 
(8) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
and shall be fined not less than $100, who: 
(a) when requested to provide security infor-
mation under Subsection (1) provides false infor-
mation; 
(b) falsely represents to the department that 
security required under this chapter is in effect; 
or 
(c) sells a vehicle to avoid the penalties of this 
section as applicable either to himself or a third 
party. tees 
41-8-36. Repealed. 1M7 
41-6-37. Accident reports — Forms — Contents 
— Penalties for failure to make report. 
(1) The department shall prepare and upon request 
supply to police departments, justices of the peace, 
sheriffs, garages, and other appropriate agencies or 
individuals, forms for accident reports as required in 
this article, suitable for the persons required to make 
the reports and the purposes to be served. The written 
reports to be made by persons involved in accidents as 
requested by investigating officers shall require suffi-
ciently detailed information to disclose the cause, 
conditions then existing, and the persons and vehicles 
involved in the traffic accident. 
(2) Every accident report requested under Section 
41-6-35 shall be made in writing and on the appropri-
ate form approved by the department. It shall contain 
accident as requested under Section 41-6-35 until „ 
report has been filed. The department may extend tat $L 
suspension, not to exceed 30 days. Any person ma : 0 
victed of failing to make a report under Sedlai| 
41-6-35 is punishable under Section 41-6-164. 
41-6-38. Livestock on highway — Restrictions^ <$» 
Collision, action for damages. >.-.^ 
(1) A person owning or in the possession or cootnl* 
of any livestock, may not willfully or negligently paftjJ 
mit any of the livestock to stray or remain unaoooaW 
panied by a person in charge or control of the IbtA 
stock upon a highway, both sides of which * i S « ant when the identity is not otherwise known or 
is separated from t l i ^ H J . abeii the person denies his presence at the accident. adjoined by property which 
highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk,
 w fc. 
lawn, or building. This subsection does not apply uf% 
range stock drifting onto any highway in going to » ^ 
returning from their accustomed ranges. ^ 
(2) A person may not drive any livestock 
over, or across any highway during the period 
half an hour after sunset to half an hour before wa-;' 
rise, without keeping a sufficient number of herder! 
with warning lights on continual duty to open fas. 
road to permit the passage of vehicles. Vl 
(3) In any civil action brought by the owner, optrtjr 
tor, or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their par** 
sonal representatives or assignees, or by the owner afw ; „ 
the livestock for damages caused by collision wHk |^ 
any domestic animal or animals on a highway, thanK 
is no presumption that the collision was due to neftt-V 
gence on behalf of the owner or the person in 
sion of livestock. »•.» vv 
Accident reports — When confidential 
— Insurance policy information — Use 
as evidence — Penalty for false fnfor-
, mation. 
(1) All written reports required in this article to be 
fewarded to the department by operators or owners 
ef vehicles involved in accidents or by garages are 
without prejudice to the reporting individual and are 
fftrthe confidential use of the department or other 
- tfato agencies having use for the records for accident | invention purposes. However, the department may 
iielose the identity of a person involved in an acci-
person denies his presence 
] Ike department shall disclose whether any person or 
£ tthicle involved in an accident reported under this 
\ action was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and 
aw name of the insurer. 
•' (2) Written reports forwarded under this section 
[<«iy not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or 
criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the 
apartment shall furnish upon demand of any party 
tt the trial or upon demand of any court a certificate 
•Sowing that a specified accident report has or has 
sot been made to the department in compliance with 
kw, and if the report has been made, the date, time, 
tad location of the accident, the names and addresses 
at the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved, 
.lad the investigating officers. The reports may be 
*• md as evidence when necessary to prosecute charges 
fled in connection with a violation of Subsection (3). 
"(8) A person who gives information in oral or writ-
' tea reports as required in this chapter knowing or 
> string reason to believe that the information is false | wfoilty of a class A misdemeanor. iss7 
? 41*41. 
41-6-38.5. Peace officer Investigating accidea* f;? 
to notify owner If livestock or broke* 
fence involved — Exempt from UabsV 
,ty
- £«• 
(1) A peace officer investigating an accident results , » 
ing in injury or death of any livestock shall raakl/V 
reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate U»M 
owner of the livestock and inform the owner of Ifca pjj 
injured or dead animal. /• •{ 
(2) A peace officer investigating an accident result ' 
ing in a broken fence, if it appears the fence contains ., 
or controls the movement of livestock, shall make'''.'. 
reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate titt,,' 
owner of the property and inform the owner of the i 
broken fence. • wt ••^R •tinicipal department a written report of the acci-
(3) Civil or criminal liability for claims does n*V$^!' Imt or a copy of any report required under this arti-
arise against any rjeace officer for failure to locate the 
owner of the livestock or property. This subsedioa?ij 
does not preclude disciplinary action by the df—* •*' 
Statistical information regarding acci-
dents — Annual publication. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all 
strident reports and shall publish annually, or at 
•ore frequent intervals, related statistical informa-
Ita as to the number and circumstances of traffic 
•tridents. ias7 
114-42. Local powers to require report 
k local authority may by ordinance require that | Ike operator of a vehicle involved in any accident, or 
'"* At owner of the vehicle, also file with the designated 
icopy < 
9r< Je to be filed with the department on accidents occur-
ring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the 
eenfidential use of the municipal department and are 
ment against a peace officer for failure to polbmWt^^ subject to Section 41-6-40. 
duties required by this section. tair '.*r 
41-6-39. Garage keeper to report damaged veaJ. 
cle without damage sticker. V, 
(1) The person in charge of any garage or repair \ 
shop who receives a vehicle which shows evidence of ' 
having been involved in an accident for which a writ*, 
ten report may be requested under Section 41-6-35, or * 
having been struck by any bullet, shall report tht / 
vehicle to the nearest office of an authorized law en- ' 
forcement agency within 24 hours after the vehicle te * 
received by the garage or repair shop, giving the ve-
hicle identification number, registration number, tad 
the name and address of the owner or operator of the * 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND 
,1 
1414-43. 
RECKLESS DRIVING 
Local DUI and related ordinances and 
reckless driving ordinances — Consis-
tent with code. 
II) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
amrns a person's operating or being in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in 
aw blood or while under the influence of alcohol or 
r drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
ern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority thn 
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle ii 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of person 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions c 
this code which govern those matters. IM 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. is* 
41-6-44. Driving under the Influence of alcohc 
or drug or with specified or unsaf 
blood alcohol concentration — Mei 
surement of blood or breath alcohol -
Criminal punishment — Arrest will 
out warrant — Penalties — Susponsio 
or revocation of license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided i 
this section for any person to operate or \w 
actual physical control of a vehicle within Ih 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcoh 
concentration of .08 grnms or greater as shov 
by a chemical test given within two hours afl 
the alleged operation or physical control, or if tl 
person is under the influence of alcohol or ai 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol ai 
any drug to a degree which renders the pers 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violi 
ing this section is or has been legally entitled 
use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against a 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath sh 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first time of a vi€ 
tion of Subsection (1) fa guilty of a class B mis 
meanor. But if the person has also inflicted b 
ily injury upon another as a proximate resull 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent m 
ner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(b) In this section, the standard of neglige 
is that of simple negligence, the failure to ei 
cise that degree of care which an ordinarily l 
sonable and prudent person exercises under 1 
or similar circumstances. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the c< 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mar 
toryjail sentence of not less than 48 consecu 
hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to 
require the person to work in a community 
vice work program for not less than 24 hours 
more than 50 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or com 
nity-service work program, the court shall c 
the person to participate in an assessment 
educational series at n licensed alcohol rehe 
tation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violi 
committed within six years of a prior violi 
under this section or under a local ordinance 
ilar to this section adopted in compliance 
Section 41-6-43 the court shall as part of any 
tence impose a mandatory jail sentence o 
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more 
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(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-ser-
vice work program for not less than 80 hours nor 
more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabili-
tation facility. The court may, in its discretion, 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alco-
hol rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of two prior violations under this 
section or under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 
41-6-43 is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as pro-
vided in Subsections (6)(a)(ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the 
prior convictions are for violations commit-
ted after April 23, 1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (6)(a)(i) the court 
shall as part of any sentence impose a man-
datory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor 
more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to 
jail, require the person to work in a commu-
nity-service work program for not less than 
240 nor more than 720 hours. 
(in) In addition to the jail sentence or com-
munity-service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) (i> Under Subsection (6)(a)(ii) the court 
shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of 
not lees than $1,000 and impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor 
more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to 
jail, require the person to work in a commu-
nity-service work program for not less than 
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the 
court enters in writing on the record the rea-
son it finds the defendant should not serve 
the jail sentence. Enrollment in and comple-
tion of a chemical dependency rehabilitation 
program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or com-
munity service if the program provides in-
tensive care or inpatient treatment and long-
term closely supervised follow-through after 
the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or com-
munity-service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a vio-
lation committed within six years of the prior 
violations under this section is a third degree fel-
ony if at least three prior convictions are for vio-
lations committed after April 23, 1990. The prior 
convictions may be under this section or under a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence im-
pose a fine of not leas than $1,000 and impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(c) The court may, as an alternative to jail. 
writing on the record the reason it finds the oV 
fendant should not serve the jail sentence. Bn- _ 
rollment in and completion of a chemical deptn- $ fl 
dency rehabilitation program approved by tin l i 
court may be a sentencing alternative to inetr* *f 
ceration or community service if the progrui H 
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment # 
and long-term closely supervised follow-throogn M'M 
after the treatment. * i l l 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or comma- ^ 
nity-service work program, the court shall ord* i - ' 
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol n* p-\ 
habilitation facility. "'''•'$; 
(8) (a) No mandatory portion of any sentence if. In-
quired under this section may be suspended m l •£ 
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or &. 
probation until any sentence imposed under this j|> 
section has been served. Probation or parole ft» ] | ! 
suiting from a conviction for a violation of tall $ P 
section or a local ordinance similar to this section "% 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-49(11 
may not be terminated. >. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any nV''• 
cense suspended or revoked as a result of the cofV 
viction under this section, if it is a second or rot**' 
sequent conviction for a violation committal ! 
within six years of a prior violation, until thi ' 
convicted person has furnished evidence satisfaev 
tory to the department that all fines and fatt,*' 
including fees for restitution and rehabilitation ; 
costs, assessed against the person have bsft>^' 
paid. yvi, 
(9) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4), (6), (6\ 
and (7) that require a sentencing court to order • 
convicted person to: participate in an assessment -• 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rthn» \f. 
bilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of Un ijg 
court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation oV'nijtf 
cility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an oJe* V-^ . 
hoi rehabilitation facility; or do any combination^ 
of those things, apply to a conviction for a viola* '$ 
tion of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior j | 
conviction under Subsection (10). The court shaft \*£ 
render the same order regarding education a? ,^Sj 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, •? 
both, in connection with a first, second, or iub*> i 
quent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that j 
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection 
(10), as the court would render in connection, 
with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subooo*4 
tions 41-6-44(4), (5), (6), and (7). < 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a con*'/ 
viction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified nt $<$ 
a prior conviction under Subsection (10) is a fitnVj ^ 
second, or subsequent conviction under this onV |& 
section, a previous conviction under either tMorJ| 
section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior M_. 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program anl t' 
any community-based or other education pro* ^  
gram provided for in this section shall be on* r. 
proved by the Department of Human Servian. \ 
(10) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a pleo of ;«fc 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of .& 
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a aubotft* 
tute for, an original charge of a violation of Into 
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in connection with the violation. The statement 
is an offer of proof of the facts which shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defen-
dant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection 
t« of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defen-
t ' dant's plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of ^ violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption 
i: of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by 
the defendant in connection with the violation, 
the resulting conviction is a prior conviction for 
the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
i; (c) The court shall notify the department of 
} \ each conviction of Section 41-6-45 which is a 
:
Jv
 prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), 
(6), and (7). 
: ( l l ) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
\ I person for a violation of this section when the offi-
. car has probable cause to believe the violation has 
^ occurred, although not in his presence, and if the ofli-
fcr has probable cause to believe that the violation 
-•' wis committed by the person. 
(12) The Department of Public Safety shall sus-
, pead for 90 days the operator's license of any person 
' wnvicted for the first time under Subsection (1), and 
* otoll revoke for one year the license of any person 
OMivicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(I) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
jeara from the date of the prior violation. The depart-
. Bent shall subtract from any suspension or revoca-
tion period the number of days for which a license 
. t w previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if 
the previous suspension was based on the same occur-
!' ttnce upon which the record of conviction is based. 
*:••• iwi 
f 
' 414-44.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
V The Department of Public Safety shall comply with 
J to procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
414-44.2. Repealed . iasa 
;1
- 414-44.3. S tandards for chemical breath analy-
sis — Evidence. 
^ (1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administra-
tion and interpretation of chemical analysis of a per-
0*9'! breath, including standards of training. 
,v (2) In any action or proceeding in which it is mate-
Hal to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
•. pnyaical control of a vehicle while under the infiu-
H tare of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood 
or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, docu-
:. Menti offered as memoranda or records of acts, condi-
'; Mont, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
'
;
 and the instrument used was accurate, according to 
• standards established in Subsection (1), are admissi-
on) if: 
._&''" (a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
Ut regular course of the investigation at or about 
';tij» the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
•)'/ (b) the source of information frw« i»kt«.u «.-J-
test results are valid and further foundation for ii 
duction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate 
hide with detectable alcohol in b 
— Chemical test procedures — Tern 
rary license — Hearing and decisioi 
Suspension of license or operat 
privilege — Fees — Judicial revie 
(1) (a) A person less than 21 years of age may 
operate or be in actual physical control of a v< 
cle while there is any measurable or detecta 
alcohol, other than naturally occurring alcol 
in his body with a blood, breath, or urine alco 
concentration of less than .08 grams as cal 
lated under Subsection 41-6-44(2). 
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator licet 
who violates Subsection (a), in addition 
any other applicable penalties arising out 
the incident, shall have his operator !i< or 
denied or suspended as provided in Subst 
tion (ii). 
(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subst 
tion (i), the division shall deny the pc 
son's operator license if ordered or n 
challenged under this section for a p 
riod of 90 days beginning on the 31 
day after the date of the arrest und< 
Section 32A-12-209. 
(B) For a second or subsequent offens 
under Subsection (i), within three yeai 
of a prior denial or suspension, the div 
sion shall suspend the person's operate 
license for a period of one year begin 
ning on the 31st day after the date c 
arrest. 
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued ai 
operator license who violates Subsection (a) 
in addition to any other penalties arising ou 
of the incident, shall be punished as providec 
In Subsection (ii). 
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, which-
ever is longer, a person may not operate a 
vehicle and the depnrtment may not. issue 
the person an operator license or learner's 
permit. 
(2) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person may be violating 
or has violated Subsection (1), the peace officer 
may, in connection with arresting the person for 
a violation of Section 32A-12-209, request that 
the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be 
administered in compliance with the standards 
under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person 
prior to the person's submission to a chemical 
test that a test result indicating a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a) will result in denial or suspen-
sion of the person's license to operate a motor 
vehicle or a refusal to issue a license. 
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and 
the test results indicate a blood, breath, or urine 
alcohol content in violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
or if the officer makes a determination, based on 
reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise 
in violation of Subsection (1 Ma). th#» nfRr«w *is—.* 
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State v. Korin Vanhouten 
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Livingston 
-- Richard P. Mauro 
Dn -- Vince Meister 
seems to me is a concept which is covered at least to most folks by 
clear Utah law. Now if some other court wants to say, urn, you 
know, in Utah you gotta do it this way, it seems it has to be a 
Utah court and if a Utah court hasn't ruled on this point, I don't 
think I can impute to the officer's knowledge of something that 
doesn't exist. Uh, which is, ??? uh, Alaska and Kansas, I mean, he 
can't be governed by everything that goes there. But, uh, I can 
get a look at the Provo city case and make my determination later. 
ATD: Ok. I have those available if you'd like those. So. 
JUDGE: Well, I appreciate that. Thank you for doing the work. 
Then do we want to talk about gaze nystagmus on this? 
ATP: We're here. 
JUDGE: Are you going to ask, uh, for him when they set the ??? to 
talk about it? 
ATP: I don't know that, I think this is again, Your Honor, a legal 
argument as far as whether or not this is something that should be 
ATD: Can I say something? I don't if you want me to introduce 
this into evidence or not. 
JUDGE: If you feel like you need to make reference, that's fine. 
ATD: Alright. I think, I think she read what was stated. 
JUDGE: She read the material ??? 
ATD: That's fine. 
JUDGE: Now, Mr. Meister why do you think it's a legal argument? 
ATP: Well essentially, Your Honor, because the case law says that 
it is. Uh, whether or not this meets the Frve test is a question 
of whether or not it needs to meet the Frye test and, uh, the 
/ 
purpose is to the state is admitting the HGN for. Urn, so as far as 
the first part of his motion whether or not# let me get the proper 
motion here, whether or not ??? gains general acceptance within the 
scientific community or is inherently reliable is a legal argument. 
It has nothing to do with what the officers are going to testify 
to. Now, whether or not that test was applied properly or whether 
or not the officers are qualified to do that particular test that 
might get to the second part of the motion where he says that 
Officer Michaud does not have the scientific training. And again 
it's the state's position that that's a legal argument considering 
the case law that's come out on that. And even if he isn't 
qualified that goes to the weight not to the admissibility and I 
think uniformly the court's have held that. 
JUDGE: My initial reaction, I don't know how you want to respond, 
is that, uh, it's not gained any judicial or scientific, uh, weight 
at all. I mean, I'm not aware of any Utah case that says it's a 
good idea and I don't recall having heard in a courtroom setting 
under oath one ??? as they say evidence what is means at all. I 
mean, I know that the officer testifies the eye jiggled but, uh, 
you'd have to be, I guess, brighter than this Judge to know what 
that means in terms of alcohol and impairment. 
ATP: Well, Your Honor, I have several cases from several states 
where in fact it has gained general acceptance. 
JUDGE: Well again, uh, I appreciate that, Mr. Meister, but I don't 
know how we can apply what happens in other states to Utah . . . 
ATP: Because the courts in this state have been ??? it in and, as 
a matter of fact, I do have a memorandum decision that, urn, that 
2-
came down and I don't have the printed form, uh, Judge Hutchings' 
decision where in fact he cited several of those cases and as far 
as the reliability and at least his, uh, perception that we've used 
them in both Judge Livingston's court and several of the other 
circuit courts as to its reliability . . . 
JUDGE: I guess for, maybe I'm the odd man out because, uh, I mean 
when somebody says I can't walk a straight line or I can't touch 
my, we did this the other day, I can't touch my fingertips, I mean 
that, to me, makes sense. I mean, uh, that shows impairment that 
my eyeball wiggles when it gets at 45 degrees doesn't mean a thing 
to me. And, uh, until somebody shows me what it means then it's 
it's nothing, it's not relevant. I mean if it doesn't pass ??? for 
relevancy let alone scientific support. So that's my feeling about 
it. 
ATP: Well, then maybe this is an issue that then that defense 
counsel and I should brief and support with the case law and the 
cases that have come out on the arguments for and against it. 
ATD: Well, Judge . . . 
JUDGE: Why ??? If the case says, urn, what will the case say that 
you think? 
ATD: They indicate essentially what the testimony is and what the 
HGN actually means and what it's supposed to indicate and the 
reliability . . . 
JUDGE: ??? Is there evidence in those cases about that? 
ATP: Very much. 
JUDGE: Right. It seems to me somewhere somebody otta have the 
courtesy to present to a Judge who handles these cases that kind of 
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evidence. And after that, I guess, you could pile the books as 
high as you'd like and I wouldn't be persuaded. I mean, it seems 
to me that as a threshold somebody otta come convince some person 
in the courtroom and maybe you don't have to do it every time, 
maybe a Judge can say, you know I got convinced I'm gonna let it 
in. I mean, it seems as a courtesy that somebody would come and 
say this is what we're doing and why. And to say, well we did it 
for somebody else so you certainly otta accept it, uh, I mean, it's 
basic courtesy. I mean, it's kinda like, uh, if Mr. Mauro were to 
say to you, Mr. Nolan gave me X deal, you've gotta give me the 
same, you say well no that's Mr. Nolan, that's not me. And I guess 
that's my point if, uh, somebody wants to show me that it works I'm 
happy to see it but until then I'm going to say it's, it doesn't 
have any support in fact. 
ATP: And what is it that you're saying that it would take to 
convince you? 
JUDGE: Well, I would like some testimony from someone, uh, the 
analogy is that Mr. ??? is here, er, no it's Zdunich is here. He 
tells you why the machine works and so I can say, yeah, the cases 
that support it have some basis because I see that, I've never 
heard a person tell me why or how your eye starts to wiggle when 
the pen is out here. 
ATP: So what you're saying is you don't want the memos that have 
that information, I mean, you'd rather hear it like testimony? 
JUDGE: Well, I think that's the way the court works. I I think 
that's how courts traditionally have done their work. In the cases 
from other jurisdictions where a Judge has been persuaded, I think 
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that's fine but it seems to me you every, uh, prosecutor or 
defendant whatever the evidence is has at some time of the duty to 
show the Judges hearing the case these things work. Is that clear 
enough? I mean, maybe I could be more clear, I don't know what I, 
if I 'm not being clear in what I'm saying. So I mean if it's a 
legal argument I don't think you prevail. 
ATP: ??? To clarify this also, according at least to the cases and 
also in this state as far as Frye is not necessary for probable 
cause that you do not have to meet the Frye standard for probable 
cause as far as for scientific reliability to get to probable cause 
and essentially that this being another field sobriety test. 
JUDGE: And I, quite honestly, have no problem if the officer comes 
up and he says 'and as part of this I held a pen like this and when 
I got up here her eye wiggled' . If that's all he says that's fine. 
But if somebody asks him what does that mean then he better know 
more than most officers do about the body's functioning under the 
influence of alcohol cause when he starts in to tell us what it's 
about he's not going to get very far if the defense attorney knows 
anything and asks him for credentials for how he got to this 
opinion that the fluttering eyeball meant that they were ??? 
ATP: And well, essentially that's where we differ because the case 
law essentially says is that the officers do not have to go into 
that scientific as far as laying proper foundation that they do not 
have to . . . 
JUDGE: See now, I would agree with Mr. Meister and I'll go back 
again, if every anybody come into here ever and said this is how it 
works. See, I mean, I don't think the officer has to tell me every 
DUI case that the breathaly, uh, breath machine works that the 
intoxylyzer works because it's been shown to me but nobody has 
shown me this thing means anything. And it's not a common sense 
result of# of the influence of alcohol. Such as your imbalance, 
your inability to speak, those things we all know because we live 
in the world that that's the way it works. But the eyeball is a 
little different. When we ask it to hold our head still and swing 
out here is just a different concept which it seems to me only 
works if somebody can lay the the predicate the foundation that 
this is what happens when you consume alcohol and that's why it has 
some bearing. 
ATP: Ok. 
JUDGE: So I mean, I appreciate the cases may have done that. I 
guess I'm just, urn, back on the old thing. Somebody otta tell me 
about it. 
ATP: And if the officer or at least Zdunich can do that then we're 
not, are you saying then we will not have to meet that as far as, 
urn, that the officer would have to require an expert interpretation 
of that also? 
JUDGE: That part you're losing me on. 
ATP: Well, essentially the case law says that the officer does not 
have to make an expert interpretation of what it is that he 
observes. 
(Conversation overlaps between Judge and ATP) 
JUDGE: I agree, then, I mean, the officer can't be an expert. 
ATP: I'm going to call Joe(?) Zdunich. 
ATD: Do you have a ??? 
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ATP: I don't what his V-tay(?) is. 
ATD: Curriculum Vtay? Resume'. Does he have a Vtay? 
ATP: You can ask him. 
ATD: And, Judge, maybe I otta, before he comes in if I may be 
allowed to respond for just a moment before he comes in just to 
maybe clarify a couple of things that you spoke about in terms of, 
in terms of foundational requirements and this is what I'm asking 
the court to pay some attention to. There are two rules of 
evidence, 701 and 702 that deal with expert testimony. It's our 
position that they have to establish number one, a foundation of 
their expert to show as you were saying, to show that this test is 
inherently reliable under Phillips. under Rammasch, under Koeffer, 
which are the three Utah cases. Mr. Meister is talking about the 
Koeffer, Phillips standard which, which in this instance is the HOA 
praternity test. And I don't know if you remember Phillips and 
Koeffer but a couple of times people kept appealing these cases on 
this praternity test. Well, by the time they either got to either 
Phillips or Koeffer, I don't remember which order there was uniform 
acceptance in the scientific community that indeed the HLA was a 
scientifically reliable test and was 99.6 percent accurate so the 
court said like in the intoxylizer case, we're not going to, we're 
not going to make you put an expert on to establish the scientific 
base or the scientific foundation of the science. We will let you 
cross-exam their witness about how the test was done but we're 
going to take judicial notice that the scientific test is accurate. 
I think that's what he is trying to do here. And when you look at 
the jurisdictions, the various jurisdictions, they're split 
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probably about 60-40 against letting the, the, uh, HGN in. The 
most recent cases are State v. Witte, which is a Kansas case. Ex 
parte Malone which is now a ??? case. People v. Lewis which is a 
California case. Those there cases say it doesn't come in. There, 
there's a bunch of new scientific empirical evidence that says HGN 
isn't reliable the way it's done under the circumstances here. 
It's not done because, number one, the police officer can't 
establish foundation. You need a doctor, you need an 
opthamologist, you need a, you need a neurologist, you need one of 
those sorts of people to establish the ??? between the jerking of 
the eye and alcohol and why it's caused and the physiological faces 
for it and all that sort of stuff. I don't think their witness is 
going to be able to say that and, and, so where we're left at is, 
can you take judicial notice of this and the case that he has from 
Judge Hutchings, I'm going to appeal on that I think. It's 
probably Saxton. And it's my appeal it went from Mr. Long over to 
our office and I'm doing the appeal so that's kind of in limbo. 
That's the only pending appeal before the Court of Appeals right 
now and I anticipate briefings going to be probably another two 
months away on that so, if, if, if, what we're doing here today is 
saying this is inherently reli, this is inherently reliable and not 
judicially noticed I think we're kind of wasting our time. And I 
just want to indicate that to the court. 
ATP: I don't think that's what the state's saying, Your Honor. 
Urn, that's been misconstrued. Essentially what the state is saying 
is that, that scientific evidence does not need to meet the Frye 
test for probable cause and cases that he's talking about where 
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they let that, where they did not let it in, it was for trial 
purposes, for admission purposes at trial not for probable cause. 
These cases actually say that it's ok for probable cause (tape 
ends) 
SIDE B 
ATP: Our United States Supreme Court in Brennegar v. United States 
said the same thing. I mean, we have things as far as hearsay and 
prior, uh, admissions and and things that the officers use as far, 
uh, improper confessions or, uh, prior bad acts that we can use as 
evidence as probable cause and certain scientific things that we 
can use towards that fact but they do not have to meet the the Frye 
test for probable cause. That's what we're going here for. This 
is strictly towards probable cause. It's another test that goes 
toward probable cause. We're not trying to establish admissibility 
at trial or inherently reliable or anything to that effect. We 
don't have to meet that standard to determine probable cause and 
bar courts, the United States Supreme Courts, and even the Courts 
that he's talking about echo the same thing. What he's saying, 
though, is, what he's saying as far as admissibility at trial to 
meet the Frye test is a totally separate issue. We're not talking 
about probable cause, we're talking about admissibility at trial. 
But what he's talking about in the cases that didn't allow it in. 
JUDGE: Well, now that we've focused that much, Mr. Mauro, uh, do 
you object to ??? to establish probable cause? 
ATD: I do, Your Honor, because I don't think you can establish the 
nexxus(?) between, it's getting back to the basic thing you were 
just talking about. How do you establish a nexus between me taking 
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a couple of bottles of beer and drinking them . . . 
JUDGE: Well, I think it is a lesser burden when it comes to 
establishing probable cause . . . 
ATD: Yeah, but you're still talking about a scientific test. You 
have to go, you have to . . . 
JUDGE: I mean, I don't know what evidence I'm going to hear but it 
seems ??? less than what you're, you know, describing to me. 
ATD: How can you get unless you have an expert, maybe Zdunich is. 
I don't think he is but maybe he is. How can you establish when I 
throw my pen out in front of you . . . 
JUDGE: Well, that's eleven feet . • . 
ATD: The nexus between those two. If you, you know, without 
establishing first, number one, that he's an expert. Number two, 
that there's some inherent scientific reliability in just that 
nexus itself. 
JUDGE: Right. But, I, I, think the method of establishing that 
is, uh, a lessen burden, er, that's . . • 
ATD: Well, not, no not at, you're misunderstanding. Not when 
you're saying, not when you have a novel scientific. Even if 
you're talking about probable cause I don't think a jury can say, 
you know, I'm Joe Blow expert I'm sitting on the witness stand. I 
used probable cause because I . . . 
JUDGE: My sense is, maybe I'm missing something fundamental, but 
when we get to trial Mr. Meister is not even gonna ask about it. 
Because unless the issue of probable cause comes up. 
ATP: I don't need it for the probable cause in this case. 
ATD: Well . . . 
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ATP: There's plenty without it but we have this motion and 
essentially . . . 
JUDGE: It seems to me that there are two ways this could come up. 
Did he have probable cause to arrest, therefore, suppress ??? 
anything that follows after and if you're gonna fight him on that 
issue that seems like what we can talk about here today. But if 
the issue is, is it going to come in at trial that has some 
foundation ???. Based on what I'm hearing, I doubt Zdunich is 
going to give me enough to let it in at trial. And I get the sense 
from what you're hearing from me, you're not going to try and get 
it in at trial. 
ATP: Well, it's limited to admissibility for probable cause. It 
goes to that for that purpose but it isn't as far as, it isn't used 
and the courts are not allowing it to be used as a level of 
intoxication. 
JUDGE: Right. From what I understand, Mr. Meister, your testimony 
is going to be something like I put the pen when it got here the 
eye wavered. I had her do this. I had her do that. Based on that 
I felt I had probable cause to arrest. 
ATP: Uh-huh. 
JUDGE: May I sense that's all we're going to hear? 
ATP: ??? defense counsel will ask what demeans the waver and that 
he can . . . 
ATD: Well, but, but, but, how can you establish, how can you allow 
an officer to testify when he, there is absolutely no foundation or 
purpose other than maybe balance or some kind of, I mean, what he's 
saying is, 'I did this and I saw the eyes waver'. 
i! 
JUDGE: Right. 
ATD: He cannot establish any sort of scientific . . . 
JUDGE: Ok. Now if we're going to go . . . 
ATD: It's completely irrelevant is what you . . . 
JUDGE: ??? fight about the issue of can he do that much then we 
otta go ahead with this. 
ATP: That's fine. We'll bring him in. But what I'm asking the 
court to do is look at it and the scientific reliability is not the 
inherent reliable, the Frye test for probable cause. 
JUDGE: Right. I understand, I understand, I think, the difference 
in the level. 
(Voices jumble together) 
JUDGE: Can I enquire, does anybody call the other two troopers for 
anything? Maybe somebody otta excuse them. Mr. Mauro, do you 
sense, I mean, I don't think we're into that. 
ATD: I don't need to, believe I need to have those troopers . . . 
ATP: It's the second part of the motion if you're saying we're not 
going to need the expert ??? expert. 
ATD: I'm not, I'm not going to call any witnesses only because I 
think the proponent of the evidence under Rimmasch has got to 
establish . . . 
JUDGE: Well, no, what I'm trying to think out loud is if there in 
uniform it means they're on duty, right? It seems like we're not 
wise to just keep them here. But, I mean, maybe you're going to 
call. 
ATP: I believe . . . 
JUDGE: I'll quit trying to think of their convenience . . . 
\r 
ATP: I believe the court answered my question. 
JUDGE: Go right ahead. 
ATD: We appreciate that, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Your turn. 
ATP: Please state your name. Spell your last name for the record. 
WITNESS: (I have no idea what he said) 
ATP: What's your occupation? 
WITNESS: I'm a trooper at the Utah Highway Patrol. 
ATP: How# how long have you been so employed? 
A: Approximately 15 years. 
Q: Can you tell me, uh, your training and experience during that 
15 years and especially the training that deals with, uh# 
scientific tests such as the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. 
A: Uh, I started in law enforcement approximately 18 and a half 
years ago in Las Vegas where I was ??? with apprehension, detection 
and prosecution of drinking drivers as part of my basic training in 
Las Vegas. I stepped out of law enforcement and came back in in 
1970. I took all the training through the police academy. 
Subsequent to that I received training in Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
for alcohol. Also, I received training in Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus for alcohol and other substances. 
Q: How many hours? 
A: Uh, the second one was 40 hours. The first one was the basic 
16 hour classes. This is a field officer. 
Q: Continue. 
A: I've been associated with numerous studies involving briefing 
subjects. I've written, matter of fact I'm published on two 
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studies internationally dealing with alcohol and the effects of 
alcohol with a certified instructor by the police academy in 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, alcohol detection and prosecution, 
intoxilyzer operation, maintenance, and trouble-shooting. I've 
personally arrested approximately 300 hundred impaired drivers 
myself. I've observed over 2,000 and I ??? subjects on a regular 
basis in Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus schools approximately 20-25 a 
year that I ??? monitoring the effects and observe the clues 
associated with Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus and the effects of 
alcohol for students. 
Q: How many studies have you observed or how many studies have 
you, urn, studied on Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus? 
A: I peruse probably about 60 80 pages a week of material that is 
alcohol and drug related in ???. I couldn't specify how many pages 
were specifically on Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. 
Q: How many times have you personally administered the Horizontal 
Gaze Nystagmus and also with that, observed, uh, it being 
administered? 
A: I worked on the road in Salt Lake County for approximately nine 
and a half years. All but two years of that I was certified as a, 
to use the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. As I said, I've arrested 
approximately 300 of my own intoxicated individuals. In all, I 
would say about 25 or 30 of those Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus was in 
fact performed on those individuals. I've backed up probably 
another three to four hundred arrests for other officers that I was 
the backup man for those used. 
Q: How many people have you instructed on Horizontal Gaze 
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Nystagmus? 
A: Every police department in the state of Utah. I've had 
numerous ??? from every department ???. For the total amounts, it 
would be in the thousands. 
Q: How many years have you been practicing, uh, using Horizontal 
Gaze Nystagmus? 
A: All but two years, well, excluding my Las Vegas time, all but 
two years of my career here. So I'd say approximately, I'd say 12 
or 13 years here and I've been instructing at approximately 4 and 
a half years. 
Q: Can you tell us, uh, in your trading in experience as far as 
your, uh, reading what it is that Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus is 
supposed to be. 
ATD: I object Your Honor. Uh, there's no foundation for that 
testimony. 
JUDGE: What I'd like to hear maybe in the, we're just trying to 
convince me and not the rest of the world. I'd like to understand 
about these ??? up people and what he sees as a result when he can, 
I mean, I guess he administers alcohol, then he gives Gaze 
Nystagmus and he sees the result. How often is he done that. What 
is the result percentage of time it does A, percentage it does B, 
or whatever. 
ATD: Uh, and I understand what you want and I would like to 
continue objection to that because I don't think there's an 
adequate foundation for him to make that determination under the 
circumstances. 
JUDGE: What do you think more foundation . . . 
is-
ATD: Well, I think when you look at the cases and you look at 
Whitte and all those cases, you have to have someone that can come 
in that can talk about field of expertise. 
JUDGE: Alright. And so, Mr. Mauro, uh, let me just say what I 
think. We say, you know, because I have slurred speech that's an, 
an indication that I am impaired or I've consumed alcohol. We 
don't do that because we know how the alcohol goes through and what 
it effects in terms of neurons. We do it because we've seen it. 
Our experience tells us that that's what happens. And I guess if 
this officer can tell me that then it becomes just like any of the 
^ther field experiences. 
ATD: So you're suggesting then, you're adopting the minority 
position of the three states that have said, it's, it's sort of 
similar to JL^y^ootimony^nd the rest of the states in the country 
that say this is a scientific test. You're, you're saying it's not 
a scientific test. \ 
JUDGE: If he can tell me that he does it in test subjects and 
they, I mean I 'm not trying to coach him. I'm just trying to 
argue with you here because he's already been coached more than he 
needs. But, I'm just saying that if he can say that my, yeah, I 
guess that if that's what your saying the minority view I would 
adopt that. 
ATD: Ok. 
JUDGE: In terms of it being a good field test, field sobriety test 
ATP: Not objective. That's the ??? 
JUDGE: Well, I don't know what it is but I'm, just to speak to 
Mr. Mauro and what he was saying. 
ATP: So Trooper Zdunich, uh, you talk about, uh, testing some of 
these people that have actually that you doped up that you gave, 
uh, controlled substances to. Can you tell us what you gave them 
and what it is that you observed in your testing? 
A: The substance that we utilize is alcohol. We stay away from 
the other pharmacological substances due to the fact that the 
unpredictability on the organs and their response they might have 
an allergy to it or something of that sort. 
Q: What kind of alcohol do you use? 
A: We acquire our alcohol, it's usually 80 proof or 100 proof from 
the liquor control commission and on the seal, in sealed bottles. 
Q: And do you monitor the consumption of that? 
A: Yes, we do. We monitor the consumption and utilize Whitmark 
formula to project into a certain raise that we would have that 
individual be impaired to produce the signs and symptoms 
symptomology(?) that the officers can use on live subjects for 
training purposes. 
Q: What is this Whitmark scale that you talked to me about? 
A: Whitmark formula is a mathematical equation where if you know 
the individuals sex, uh, certain variables or weight, the type of 
alcohol you can project what the breath/alcohol content would be 
after ingesting x-amount of ounces of alcohol. 
Q: And in your training and experience using that Whitmark 
formula, uh, what percentages of accuracy have you obtained? 
A: We use that as a guide when we dose someone up we test them 
with the intoxylizer first, then we give them drinks, we project 
n 
them into a specific, into a general area, then we use the 
intoxylizer to put them into a specific area. 
Q: And how close is the general to the specific when using that 
Whitmark formula? 
A: Urn, we try to, it's not a hard and fast where we try to put 
them within one or two ounces of where we'd want it for a BAC or a 
BARC. 
ATD: I'm sorry Trooper Zdunich, but I think I, I articulated 
before but I'd like a continuing objection to all of this because 
there isn't a foundation, 
JUDGE: You don't think he's got enough foundation to tell us about 
this? 
ATD: No. I don't think he does. 
JUDGE: I think you've articulated it well. 
ATD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: So, ??? I think I've overruled. 
ATD: I think you have. 
ATP: And when you dope these people up and tell us what you do and 
the results that you get and the accuracy of those results or the 
percentage accuracy of those results? 
A: We're not looking, per say, to hit, say x-amount of ounces we 
have a specific BAC or BARC at this point. What we try for is a, 
on a, it's a two day school. The first day we try to have a 
individual that is above a .10 BAC or BARC so that the signs and 
symptomology is pronounced enough that a learning officer could see 
those signs. The whole purpose of this school is to teach them to 
be able to observe what an impaired person's eyes would do, it's 
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taught in conjunction with the law ??? test, a one leg stand test. 
Those are the two basics so we give them a variety of alternate 
tests as well. We're not looking for an exact amount of alcohol 
just in excess at that .10. 
ATP: And what is it, where is it that you use the HGN and what 
does that indicate to you during these tests? 
A: After we've dosed the individuals up to a specific point 
like . . . 
ATD: And again, I object to that. Foundation grounds. Thank you. 
JUDGE: Thank you. 
WITNESS: May I continue? 
JUDGE: You may. 
WITNESS: We does them up to excess of a .10 on the first day. On 
the second day we dose them down, we try to get between a .07 and 
a .08. Keep it in mind that it's a dynamic ???. Alcohol is 
changing as we've been ??? and as they burn off. Everyone has a 
different burn off rate. So it's a general area. We're trying to 
have a little less intense, as far as what they're seeing yet the 
??? still be observable so that they can develop those skills to be 
able to look for it, that individual that would possibly have a 
???. 
Q: Where does the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus come into this? 
A: We utilize that after we've dosed them and when we know where 
they're at prior to the tests. We put those in, we put those 
individuals out and we have the officers perform those tests. That 
is where the three tests we specifically have them test. 
Q: And what is that test and what does that test, uh, what does 
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that test supposed to mean and what do you have to support those 
results? 
A: That test is based is a probable cause tool. It's used to 
determine whether or not an individual has impairment to the degree 
that they could not safely operate a vehicle. That is used in 
conjunction with other field sobriety tests. It does not stand on 
its own. 
Q: Ok. What is the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test? Can you 
demonstrate it for us? 
A: Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, there's natural jerkiness in the 
eyes present knowledge ??? etc. 
ATD: Well, again, I object, Your Honor. I continue the objection. 
JUDGE: Now if you're going to make it a continued objection, ??? 
to object? 
ATD: I'm sorry. I, I, . . . 
JUDGE: Let me say that for every time that ??? been raised you 
would have. But you're doing a good of raising it. 
ATD: The Court of Appeals is sometimes strange about, urn, . . . 
JUDGE: Alright. Well, no . . . 
ATD: When they want you to object. And when they don't want you 
to object in . . . 
JUDGE: I understand. If you want to object, do, and don't . . . 
ATD: And I'm not suggesting there's any, there's any, I think I'd 
like to have a continuing objection and as long as you recognize 
that . 
JUDGE: You bet. I recognize it. You think that we ought not to 
be going into this inquiry because he's not qualified. 
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ATD: Right. And, I'd, and, certainly if, I'm not suggesting it's 
going to go on any further than here but if it does that's what I 
want . . . 
JUDGE: Alright. And as an observer I think he is qualified to 
tell us what happens. Ok. Thanks. Mr. Meister, go on. 
ATP: Would you demonstrate that test for us and tell us what you 
observe when you apply this test? 
WITNESS: Ok. A little background on what it is. Like I've 
stated, it's a physiological occurrence that happens in the human 
body. 
Q: Do you know if it's voluntary or involuntary? 
A: It's involuntary in nature. There are, you have a sense organ 
inside your ear cavity or channel know as the vestibular system. 
It has fluid in it. It acts a lot like a spirit level. 
JUDGE: A spirit level? 
A: For a carpenter. To tell you whether or not you have level or 
not. 
JUDGE: Why do you call it a spirit level? 
A: Cause that's what the little, it used to be called a, 
carpenters would use. It has the bubble in it ??? 
JUDGE: A spirit level. Ok. 
A: As the bubble tilts you can tell whether or not the 
surface . . . 
JUDGE: No, I understand that. I've never heard it called a 
spirit level. 
A: Ok. The vestibular system works the same way with fluid. It 
sends signals to the brain. The brain sends signals to the eyes. 
?\ 
The eyes jerk very slightly. It's not detectable at that point in 
time. All of our eyes do that. There's about 3 percent of the 
populous that have acute nystagmus which, wherever they look or you 
can stand and look at them their eyes quiver and they move all the 
time. 
Q: Where have you got this information from that you're telling us 
about now? 
A: Out of studies, uh, the original study material in the 
classroom, the material is put together by National Highway Traffic 
Safety Council, the Association of Chiefs of Police, and the 
California Institute for Testing. They've done years and years of 
testing on individuals, background studies, this was all a basis 
for the implementation of the field sobriety tests for officers to 
detect impairment. 
Q: To your knowledge, are there any opthamologists or 
optometrists, er, and medical doctors involved in these studies? 
A: I really couldn't tell you. It's not a sight test. It's not 
looking for vision acuity. It's looking for symptoms that an 
officer can see not how well an individual can focus his eyes on an 
object. 
Q: Ok. 
A: Ok. As alcohol is introduced into the system, the impairment 
takes place in the brain. The signal is received from the 
vestibular sense organs are exaggerated and the jerks become 
distinct and observable with the naked eye. It doesn't require any 
special apparatus or testing device or any vision correction or 
optometry equipment to do it. It can be seen with the naked eye. 
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Q: You said there was three percent of the populous that has 
natural nystagmus. Is there anything else that would cause that 
besides alcohol? 
A: An individual could have massive brain damage, a plate in his 
head, uh, there's different types of nystagmus. There's ???. You 
could put cold water in one ear, warm water in the other ear and 
create nystagmus. There's rotational nystagmus. You could spin an 
individual around. You would disrupt the fluids in their ears. 
You stop 'em quick you could post-rotational nystagmus. The eyes 
will jerk. You could artificially create it. There are a number 
of different, uh, items that would cause nystagmus to be present. 
Q: Ok. And what have you observed when you have performed this 
particular test? 
A: What we're looking for are clues. There are six clues in the 
test. Three for each eye unless the individual has an artificial 
eye. Then you can cut it in half obviously. We're looking for 
pursuit of the eye as it follows a stimuli or a object. We're 
looking for onset of nystagmus or that jerking, that involuntary 
jerking prior to a 45 degree angle. Whether it would be ??? in the 
corner of the eye. When we're looking for distinct nystagmus or 
jerking of maximum deviation where the eye was pulled to 
approximately 55 degrees which there would be no white showing. 
That I would look like it was pulsating and bouncing at that point. 
Three clues on each eye. They're tested 
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APPENDIX D 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
without the State having to meet the requirements of Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 702 requires that an expert must testify when a scientific test, such as the HGN, 
is involved. The horizontal gaze nystagmus test (hereinafter "HGN") is a scientific test 
requiring expert testimony. The only testimony given at trial about the HGN was given 
by Police Officer Rox Roxburgh. Officer Roxburgh is not qualified to testify as an 
expert about the reliability of the HGN test. The HGN is not a reliable test and 
therefore should not have been admitted at trial. 
Officer Roxburgh's request of the Defendant, Jerry Krambule, to perform field 
sobriety tests violated due process because Mr. Krambule was obviously injured and 
unable to perform the field sobriety tests. According to Officer Roxburgh's training, an 
officer should not ask a subject to perform these tests when that person is injured. 
Because of "the danger of unfair prejudice", the evidence should have been excluded 
pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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